

Determinants of Political Participation and Electoral Behavior in the Arab World: Findings and Insights from the Arab Barometer

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1. Introduction

Electoral participation is considered an essential part of the democratic process. Understanding *who* participates and *why* is important to determine who has a voice in politics. Are some groups/interests in society better represented than others? If so, what are the implications of these inequalities for elite's decisions and policies? In addition, if large parts of the population of a country do not participate, what does that mean for the good functioning and legitimacy of the electoral process? These questions are particularly important in the context of the Arab world, where elections are held under authoritarian conditions. Why do citizens continue to participate in elections? And how might these elections link to democratization more broadly?

These important normative questions have motivated scholars to investigate the determinants of electoral participation (as well as its consequences) in mostly Western democracies. Little work however has been done on non-Western, and especially non-democratic, settings for two reasons: on the one hand, until very recently there has been a shortage of advanced survey research in certain areas of the world; on the other hand, it is often assumed that participation exists and matters only for democracies^[1].

Yet some non-democracies regularly hold elections and have substantial levels of citizen electoral (and non-electoral) involvement. This is the case of most Arab countries. One of the puzzling aspects about these countries is that political liberalization (i.e. the creation of a parliament and the holding of elections) has not been accompanied by democratization. The literature on legislative politics in the Middle East addresses this question mostly from the perspective of political elites and has paid almost no attention to citizen's role in the electoral process.^[2] We argue that exploring *who* participates and *why* in the Arab world can give us an insight into the nature of elections in these countries and their role in stabilizing their regime.

This paper uses public opinion surveys conducted in six Arab countries (Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, and Yemen) to investigate individuals' choices to participate. The goal is three-fold: a) to test whether theories and hypothesis developed in the US and other Western democracies work in the Arab world; b) to point to context-specific factors that might be

relevant in accounting for electoral participation in Arab non-democracies; and c) to elaborate on the implications of electoral participation for political regimes in the Arab World.

2. Electoral Participation in Democratic Countries: Who participates and why?

The foundational research on electoral participation emerges in the U.S. context and focuses on *who* participates, *how* they participate and *why* they participate. This line of work aims at identifying the socio-economic characteristics, attitudes and attributes of voters, and relies mainly on individual-level data from large public opinion and electoral surveys.

One of the most consistent models produced by this research comes from the Columbia School and is known as the SES model (Rosenstone and Hanson 1993; Verba, Scholzman and Brady 2006), which states that the higher one's socio-economic status (defined in terms of education, income, social class, employment) the more likely one is to participate. In addition, several studies conclude that age also makes a difference: the older the individual the more likely he or she is to participate (Inglehart 1991; Dalton 1988).

In trying to explain this set of empirical regularities, the literature offers arguments about resources and about elite mobilization (Rosenstone and Hanson 1993; Verba, Nie and Kim 1978). On the one hand, participation is costly, therefore only those who have sufficient resources (money, time, knowledge and social connections) will participate. These resources are highly correlated with socio-economic status. On the other hand, those who are mobilized by elites will participate, but elites mobilize those that are likely to have more time, money, knowledge and social connections anyway. Therefore more proximate explanations of participation are levels of individual political knowledge and political interest, whether individuals are part of a social network (church, soccer club etc), and whether they have a sense of political efficacy and a sense of duty.

In response to this socially deterministic model, the Michigan school introduced a set of psychological elements into the equation. These scholars argued that the relationship between social characteristics and voting behavior is mediated by partisan attitudes, i.e. beliefs and feelings about the candidates, issues and parties (Campbell et al. 1960, chap. 3). These partisan attitudes are strongly affected by what they refer to as party identification, a long-standing psychological attachment to one of the two parties (in the United States). (Bartels 1998; Miller 1991)

Still other explanations have been advanced to explain voting behavior in Western democratic societies. In addition to the above explanations, Verba et al. point to the importance of a democratic political culture in determining political behavior (Verba, Scholzman and Brady 1996; Dalton 2000). The literature on political culture argues that countries with more tolerant values and with positive orientations towards government and democracy are more likely to have higher levels of participation (Inglehart 1991; Putnam and Pharr 2000). Current trends of skepticism in politics have been identified as the causes of declining levels of electoral participation (Dalton 2000).

Similarly, Abramson and Aldrich (1982) explain the decline in turnout in the US by changes in long-term attitudinal variables some of which overlap with some dimensions of political culture. More specifically they argue that the decline in party identification and in external efficacy (the perception of the government's ability to respond to its citizens and to solve pressing problems) account for this worrisome decline. This pattern has been found in Robert Putnam's work, *Bowling Alone*. Putnam offers a social capital explanation, claiming that social engagement and civic participation are declining in advanced industrial societies leading to a decline in citizen participation in politics (Dalton 2000: 928).

In sum, the literature on participation points to a multiplicity of factors explaining the different facets of participation. Depending on the questions asked some variables are more relevant than others. In this article we are less interested in aggregate electoral behavior (i.e. turnout levels) and more in comparing individual-level determinants of participation across a set of Arab countries. The following section reviews the existing literature in elections in the Middle East in order to identify which theories and hypothesis we will test in the set of Arab countries.

3. Elections in Authoritarian Contexts: The Arab World

The general themes and trends in the literature examining elections and electoral outcomes in authoritarian contexts are markedly different than the dominant themes emerging from the study of elections in democratic settings. The literature examining elections in authoritarian countries has tended to focus on the logic political elites employ for holding democratic elections. Most of this literature emphasizes authoritarian rulers' use of elections to further legitimize their rule to both domestic and international audiences. Jennifer Ghandi and Adam Przeworski (2006), for example, argue that elections in non-democratic settings enable political leaders to form coalitions with other elites, thus reducing the likelihood of opposition contestation. This finding is also substantiated by Carles Boix and Milan Svoblik (2007); they argue that this form of power sharing between the regime and potential oppositional elite is only likely in non-tyrannical settings where other capable forces can contest the regime's rule. That authoritarian rulers use elections to further solidify their base of support is a finding also advanced in studies that pertain to the Arab world and Latin America. For example, Ellen Lust-Okar (2006), Marhsa Posusney (2002) and Lisa Blaydes (2006) argue that in the context of the Arab world, elections manage political elite by bringing them into the political process. Therefore, elections keep elite accountable to the existing regime. Lust-Okar and Jamal (2002) find that authoritarian leaders tend to manipulate elections so that the electoral process results in outcomes that give domestic credibility and legitimacy to leaders in power. By uniting potential supporters and would-be opponents in an election context, Arab regimes are able to remain durable and stable across time.

Extending this argument to Latin America, Magaloni (2006) finds that the dominant party, the PRI held elections in Mexico to demonstrate and reinforce that it was invincible. Further, by holding elections, she argues, the weakness of the opposition was exposed. In a similar vein, Geddes (2005) argues that elections help rulers check the influence of other institutions like the

military. Thus, through a variety of mechanisms all emanating from elections, the regime is able to further entrench its own rule. All of this authoritarian consolidation occurs through the democratic electoral process.

Authoritarian legitimacy is not only important at the domestic level; many of these less democratic countries are invested in winning international support as well. Elections, for many international Western observers, constitute a major movement towards democracy. Thus, countries that hold elections are more likely to secure the support of Western countries in the form of aid, security, and trade agreements; elections also shield the country from international criticism. Levitsky and Way (2003) further argue that holding elections further legitimizes these authoritarian states in the international context. Authoritarian states holding elections are more likely to satisfy democratic criteria, which allows these states to continue to receive preferential treatment, aid, and other benefits from the West (See also Schedler 2002).

3.1. Citizen Incentives for Participation in Elections in the Arab World

Most of this literature, focusing on elections under authoritarian circumstances, has almost exclusively examined elections from the perspective of regimes. This literature highlights the rationale leaders employ for holding elections, the ways these elections further legitimize authoritarian leaders, and the plausible implications for democratization (see Lust-Okar 2007, Blaydes 2006; Magaoloni 2006; Levitsky and Way 2007). Few studies, however, have actually examined the logic citizens employ in participating in elections under authoritarian circumstances. In one of the few studies that systematically examines citizen rationale, Ellen Lust-Okar finds that citizens in Jordan are more likely to participate if they feel they can derive *wastas*, or benefits, from candidates. Because legislative institutions remain weak in the Arab world, party identification and policy issues, she argues, matter less for voting behavior than the possibility of receiving such *wastas*. Access to state resources thus becomes the primary motivation for participation in elections. As she notes, “The distribution of state resources trumps by far any role of elections as arenas for contest over the executive or critical policies.”¹³¹ Thus, according to Lust-Okar, citizens don’t necessarily possess democratic aspirations or policy preferences when they vote; rather, they hope to leverage more benefits from existing regimes. This finding is also echoed by Blaydes (2006).

Parliamentary elections in the Arab world are lively affairs. Candidates hold rallies, deliver speeches, distribute goods, post flyers, and visit local constituencies. Citizens, too, take great interest in campaigns. A quarter to a third of citizens in Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine and Yemen has attended a campaign event. Citizens mobilize friends and family to turn out. The elections are serious affairs. Spectators of electoral processes in the Arab world would not think the events are simply about the legitimization of authoritarian rulers. If elections are a tool to reinforce and legitimize authoritarian patterns of rule, why do citizens living under authoritarian regimes continue to participate in them? More specifically, what particular logics underpin Arab citizens' participation in elections? What factors structure greater participation? Evidence from the Arab world finds that vast majorities continue to participate in elections across

the region. In the Algerian elections of 2001, 45% of the population over 18 reported that they voted in the 2003 Jordanian elections, 59% of the voting age population participated. 62% of citizens turned out for the 2005 elections in Lebanon, while in 2003, 55% voted in Yemen. Finally, 71% of the Palestinians voted in their 2006 elections (See Table 1 below). Clearly, citizens are voting—but why?

Table 1: Voting in the Arab World

Algeria	45.2%
Jordan	58.9%
Morocco	49.8%
Lebanon	61.9%
Palestine	70.9%
Yemen	55.2%
All countries	56.9%

4. Hypotheses and Logic

This paper, using data from the Arab Barometer surveys carried out in 2006-2007 in six countries—Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, and Yemen, will analyze the sources of electoral behavior and other forms of political participation in the Arab world. With respect to electoral behavior, we test hypotheses about the determinants of voting behavior and of participating in election campaign rallies. In addition, we examine the determinants of behavior related to protest or dissent, specifically signing a petition or participating in a protest-related political demonstration.

Our hypotheses, summarized below, include some propositions drawn from research in Western democratic settings, our goal being, in part, to determine their applicability to the Arab world. Other hypotheses are informed by insights about politics in the Arab world and other non-democratic settings, an important goal in this case being to discover alternative and more robust explanations of electoral behavior and political participation in authoritarian political systems.

In presenting these hypotheses, we also make explicit the logic that leads us to think that each is sufficiently plausible to deserve attention. Associated with each proposition are thus some ideas about individual-level political dynamics in the Arab world, and in testing these hypotheses our goal is to determine whether or not these ideas are correct. Our objective, therefore, is not merely to assess the likelihood that explanatory relationships observed in Western democracies obtain in the non-democratic political systems of the Arab world. It is also, and even more, to advance our understanding of how and why ordinary Arab citizens participate in political life.

Education and Socioeconomic Status. Political Science research in Western democracies suggests that education, SES and other personal experiences that expand an individual's horizons lead to increased political participation (Rosenstone and Hanson 1993; Verba, Scholzman, and Brady 1996). The logic for this relationship is partly that these experiences increase information and awareness of the larger society of which one is a part, and that this in turn fosters both a sense

of citizen duty and the motivation to help shape the way that society is governed. The logic for this relationship may also reflect interest calculations, as well as considerations of information and awareness. Those who are better educated and more affluent tend to have more opportunities and a greater stake in the prevailing political order, and thus to have an interest in activity that supports the political system.

Although this logic is appealing, research in democratic but less-developed countries offers evidence that the explanatory power of variables related to social mobilization may be limited in some political settings. For example, Ahuja and Chibber (2007) find that poor people in India are just as likely to vote as more affluent individuals. They argue that poor people view elections as a fundamental right and are therefore as likely as others to exercise this right. Research in Latin America has also shown that SES does not account for variance in voting behavior (Fornos et. al. 2004).

Against this background, in order to determine whether variables related to social mobilization have explanatory power in the non-democratic political systems of the Arab world, we will test the following hypothesis:

H1. Better educated individuals are more likely than less well educated individuals to participate in the electoral system. They are more likely to (a) vote, and (b) attend campaign rallies

This hypothesis applies to what might be called “conventional” political participation, or perhaps “pro-system” participation. Even if one supports opposition candidates, he or she is accepting the rules of the game and participating in the established political process. The dynamics might be different, however, when political participation involves protest or dissent, such as taking part in a protest demonstration or signing a petition.

In the case of protest behavior, there would seem to be competing possibilities about the influence of education and other experiences related to social mobilization. On the one hand, following the point about interest calculations discussed above, better educated individuals would be less likely to engage in protest behavior. With a greater stake in the status quo, they would have less reason than others to do so. On the other hand, following the point about information and awareness, better educated individuals are more likely to have a sense of the deficiencies of the existing political system, especially in authoritarian or semi-authoritarian settings, and hence to be more likely to engage in political behavior involving dissent or protest. These assessments lead to the following competing hypotheses:

H2a. Better educated individuals are less likely than less well educated individuals to engage in protest behavior.

H2b. Better educated individuals are more likely than less well educated individuals to engage in protest behavior.

Civic Involvement and Civic Values. Western literature on political culture identifies a number of key elements and dimensions and suggests some of the ways these may cluster together to form what is sometimes labeled participant citizenship (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1996;

Putnam 2001). These include behavioral and quasi-behavioral considerations, such as organizational membership, other forms of civic engagement and resulting social capital, as well as political knowledge, political interest, and inter-personal trust. These also include normative orientations, such as tolerance and respect for pluralism and diversity, including support for gender equality. These elements define, perhaps in ideal terms, the model good citizen, one whose values and behavior contribute to good and responsible governance.

While these elements may not form a unidimensional syndrome, meaning that individuals with the highest (or lowest) levels in one respect are not necessarily those with the highest (or lowest) levels in every other respect, it is possible to identify two broad categories of attributes: those that are primarily behavioral in nature and may be described as pertaining to civic involvement; and those that are primarily normative in character and may be described as tolerance and a commitment to pluralism. Moreover, public opinion research in the Arab world provides empirical support for this categorization (Tessler and Gao 2007).

Civic involvement, as measured by such things as associational membership and interest in news about politics and society, would seem to contribute to both electoral and protest behavior. The logic is that those who are involved in public life in general are more likely to extend their involvement to the political realm. And since civic involvement says nothing about attitudes toward the political status quo, this would seem to be the case for both electoral and protest behavior. This reasoning leads to the following hypothesis:

H3. Individuals with higher levels of civic involvement are more likely than those with lower levels of civic involvement to (a) vote, (b) attend campaign rallies, and (c) engage in political protest behavior.

Tolerance and respect for diversity, though conceptually and empirically distinct from civic involvement, would again seem to lead to high levels on political participation. The logic with respect to voting and attending campaign rallies is that these values contribute to a sense of citizen duty and societal obligation, with electoral participation thus being encouraged by a normative orientation that respects the ideas and interests of others and, more specifically, that extends to the political arena the appreciation of pluralism and choice that is valued for society in general (Inglehart, 1991; Almond and Verba, 1963; Diamond 2002; Huntington, 2004). This leads to the following hypothesis:

H4. Individuals who are more tolerant and respecting of diversity are more likely than those who are less so to (a) vote, and also (b) attend campaign rallies.

A similar logic may apply with respect to protest participation, but this is not the only plausible relationship. On the one hand, tolerance and respect for diversity are likely to include a view that protest and dissent are legitimate, and perhaps even a citizen's duty. Put differently, a view that alternatives are acceptable would seem to encourage, or at least to make permissible, political behavior associated with dissent and protest. On the other hand, lower levels of tolerance and respect for diversity may reflect a single-mindedness and commitment that makes people more

likely to act on their beliefs and take action in defense of their perceived interests. Thus, in this case, the following competing hypotheses may be offered:

H5a. Individuals who are more tolerant and respecting of diversity are more likely than those who are less so to engage in political protest behavior.

H5b. Individuals who are less tolerant and respecting of diversity are more likely than those who are more so to engage in political protest behavior.

Political Trust. Studies of political behavior have also shown the importance of political trust. More specifically, individuals who have greater confidence in the political system, or in the most important institutions of government, are more likely to participate in politics, particularly in elections. They are more likely to think that the system is legitimate, and hence “deserving” of their involvement. They are also more likely to think that their involvement will make a difference, perhaps not as individuals but collectively, which provides sufficient motivation for their personal involvement. This reasoning leads to the following hypothesis:

H6. Individuals who have a higher level of trust in the institutions of government are more likely than those with a lower level of political trust to (a) vote, and also (b) attend campaign rallies.

Again, this logic may apply to protest participation but a different dynamic is also plausible. On the one hand, men and women who trust the political system would be more likely to believe their protests and dissent would be tolerated and, also, that this behavior could have an impact. On the other hand, however, those with lower levels of confidence in the political system may have a greater motivation to protest; they may be more likely to believe that their concerns will not be addressed through the normal and routine workings of government and, accordingly, take the view that an extra “push” on the part of citizens like themselves is required. These possibilities lead to the following hypotheses:

H7a. Individuals who have a higher level of trust in the institutions of government are more likely than those with a lower level of political trust to engage in political protest behavior.

H7b. Individuals who have a lower level of trust in the institutions of government are more likely than those with a higher level of political trust to engage in political protest behavior.

Wasta and Clientelism. New research in the Arab world finds that people participate in electoral politics in order to derive state resources and to secure clientelist access (Lust-Okar 2006; Blaydes 2006). Citizens who receive state perks and benefits are more likely to vote and participate in election campaigns. In other words, people participate less for the purpose of advancing particular issues or policies and more view a view toward supporting, gaining access to, and eventually obtaining benefits from political leaders. The benefits or resources being sought may be for one’s community, rather than for the individual, but the motivation in either instance remains one of clientelism, described by the term *wasta* in the Arab world. Although beyond the scope of the present inquiry, this clientelist orientation may influence not only whether one engages in electoral activity but also the choice of the candidates to support. To the extent that *wasta* increases the likelihood of electoral involvement, one is also likely to favor

candidates with the political connections to extract resources from the political system. In any event, with respect to the focus of the present paper, these observations about clientelism and *wasta* lead us to test the following hypothesis:

H8: Those citizens who engage in clientelist networks are more likely than others to (a) vote, and also (b) attend campaign rallies.

Clientelism may also have explanatory power with respect to protest behavior. Consistent with the political dynamics described above, citizens who engage in *wasta* may view petitions and demonstrations as another way, and perhaps a particularly appropriate way in their political environment, to build political connections. To the extent that clientelism reflects a concern for resources and benefits rather than for ideology, citizens with such a clientelist orientation may, in a political system where clientelism predominates, be more likely than others to see political protest as another way to extract resources and benefits. Alternatively, however, it may also be the case that clientelism predisposes people to work through existing political channels and leads those with a clientelist orientation to see protest behavior either as unnecessary or, should it anger those on whom they depend for benefits, as counterproductive. These competing possibilities lead to the following hypotheses:

H9a: Those citizens who engage in clientelist networks are more likely than others to engage in political protest behavior.

H9b: Those citizens who engage in clientelist networks are less likely than others to engage in political protest behavior.

Ideology and Political Islam. Islamic opposition movements are the best organized and most coherent political parties in the Arab world, and these parties have made notable gains in competitive elections in the region (Schwedler, 2006; Wickham, Gause, 2006; Lust-Okar 2006). At the same time, and indeed for this reason, Arab regimes have responded harshly and worked to limit the role of Islamic movements in the electoral process. Through harassment, corruption, the manipulation of electoral laws, and outright suppression, these regimes attempt to circumscribe the influence of Islamists in electoral politics, both during elections and in the post-election period.

The activism of Islamic parties may make those who support them more likely to involve themselves in elections. These men and women would be encouraged by the party, and they might also reason that elections are one of the few chances they have to at least embarrass if not influence the regime. On the other hand, these individuals might be more reluctant to take part in electoral politics, either because, as in the case of low political trust, they do not believe this would make any difference or, possibly, because they fear this would invite scrutiny or even sanctions from the regime.

The same competing possibilities apply in the case of protest behavior. Citizens who support opposition Islamic movements are likely to have more complaints about the political system and to be more motivated than others to register these complaints through protest behavior. Indeed, the movements they support are themselves protest movements. Alternatively, however, they may believe their protests are particularly unlikely to be tolerated by the regime and, fearful of retribution, they may be less likely to engage in protest behavior that calls attention to themselves

and, possibly, provokes a harsh response. These competing possibilities are expressed in the following hypotheses:

H10a: Those who support Islamists are more likely than others to (a) vote, (b) attend campaign rallies, and (c) engage in political protest behavior.

H10b: Those who support Islamists are less likely than others to (a) vote, (b) attend campaign rallies, and (c) engage in political protest behavior.

5. Data and Methods

This paper uses data collected by the Arab Barometer project, which has conducted large-N public opinion surveys in eight Arab countries on a variety of topics. We will be using the data from six countries: Algeria, Jordan, Morocco, Lebanon, Palestine and Yemen.[\[4\]](#)

5.1. Dependent variables: Vote, Rally and Protest

The Arab Barometer dataset contains several questions on political participation that we have grouped into three different categories: a) voting, b) rallying, and c) protesting. Table 2 presents a summary of these three dependent variables, which are all dichotomous. The variable vote captures whether an individual turned out to vote on the most recent election or not. The variable rally captures whether an individual attended a campaign meeting or rally during the last election or not. The variable protest is constructed combining two questions on two different types of participation: one is “joining together with others to draw attention to an issue or sign a petition”, and the other one is “attending a demonstration or protest march”. The questionnaire asks whether in the past three years the interviewee has done each of these activities: once, more than once, or never. We have collapsed these responses and the two questions into a dichotomous variable where 0 means that the individual did not protest (meaning he or she never signed a petition and never demonstrated) and 1 means that the individual did protest (meaning that he or she either signed a petition or demonstrated at least once).[\[5\]](#)

Table 2: Summary of dependent variables

Variable	Concept	Variable Type and Range
Vote	Did you participate in the most recent election?	Dichotomous 0=No, did not vote 1=Yes, voted
Rally	Did you attend a campaign meeting or rally during the last election?	Dichotomous 0=No, did not campaign or rally 1= Yes, campaigned or rallied
Protest	Did you sign a petition or attend a demonstration?	Dichotomous 0=No, did not protest 1= Yes, protested (signed a petition or demonstrated)

In general, we should expect that more people engage in voting than in rallying or protesting, the reason being that voting is usually a less costly and more conventional form of political participation. This is the case in many Western democracies, but does this apply to an authoritarian context? Table 3 presents the percentage of the population in each country that

engaged in each of the forms of political participation that we have identified. Two things should be noted from table 3: first, the average percentage of people engaging in voting in these six Arab countries is 56.9% which is substantially lower than turnout in many Western democracies (values in these countries usually range between 70% and 80% with the exception of the United States which is usually around 50%)[6]. However, it is a remarkably high proportion considering that these are non-democratic regimes in which elections are seen as a means to legitimize the ruling elite. Second, there are more people engaging in voting than in other more unconventional forms of participation: rallying and protesting. This is something that we would expect given that voting is the least costly form of participation. However, it is interesting to note that the protest figures are actually higher than the figures for rallying. Protesting comes second to voting in Arab countries.

Table 3: Percentage of the population engaged in each form of political participation

	Vote	Rally	Protest
Algeria	45.2%	17.2%	35.2%
Jordan	58.9%	21.1%	17.9%
Morocco	49.8%	29.3%	30.1%
Lebanon	61.9%	22.4%	50.4%
Palestine	70.9%	30.9%	44.2%
Yemen	55.2%	27.6%	43.7%
All countries	56.9%	24.8%	37.0%

A question that might come to the mind of readers is whether these forms of political participation are mutually exclusive or whether there is some overlap in the individuals that engage in each of these forms of participation. On the one hand, it could be possible that those individuals that vote are completely different from those individuals that rally, and in turn both “voters” and “ralliers” could be different from individuals that “protest”. Alternatively, we could expect that these three activities are part of a continuum of political participation so that individuals that engage in the most costly form of participation (i.e. protest) will also engage in less costly forms of participation such as rallying or voting.

In order to illuminate which scenario is more plausible and to be more specific about what our dependent variables are actually measuring we present some cross-tabulations between our three dependent variables (Tables 4, 5 and 6). These tables present (in this order): frequencies, row percentages, column percentages and total percentages.

Table 4 presents a cross-tabulation between vote and rally. In total percentages we see that a large proportion of the population did not do any of the two activities (33.9%), and that there are more voters than “ralliers”. Among voters, 64.4% only voted, whereas the rest (35.6%) voted and rallied. Among individuals who rallied very few engage only in rallying (15.7%) and most of them actually had also voted (84.3%). In sum there are two groups of voters (those that only vote and those that vote and rally), whereas most “ralliers” have also voted. Rallying seems to be a next step of participation for most voters.

Table 4: Cross-tabulation vote and rally in six Arab states

Vote	Rally		Total
	Yes	No	
Yes	1476	2673	4149
	35.6%	64.4%	100%
	84.3%	54.1%	62.0%
	22.1%	39.9%	62.0%
No	275	2267	2542
	10.8%	89.2%	100%
	15.7%	45.9%	38%
	4.1%	33.9%	38%
Total	1751	4940	6691
	26.2%	73.8%	100%
	100%	100%	100%
	26.2%	73.8%	100%

The next two tables tabulate vote and rally with protest. From these tables we want to learn whether protesters are a separate group in these societies that does not engage in more conventional forms of participation (such as voting or rallying), or whether they consider protest as an extension to voting and rallying.

Table 5: Cross-tabulation vote and protest in six Arab states

Vote	Protest		Total
	Yes	No	
Yes	1800	2295	4095
	44.0%	56.0%	100%
	69.8%	56.1%	61.4%
	27.0%	34.4%	61.4%
No	779	1797	2576
	30.2%	69.8%	100%
	30.2%	43.9%	38.6%
	11.7%	26.9%	38.6%
Total	2579	4092	6671
	38.7%	61.3%	100%
	1000%	100%	100%
	38.7%	61.3%	100%

Table 6: Cross-tabulation rally and protest in six Arab states

Rally	Protest		Total
	Yes	No	
Yes	1133	659	1792
	63.2%	36.8%	100%

	42.5%	15.6%	74.0%
	16.4%	9.6%	74.0%
No	1531	3576	5107
	30.0%	70.0%	100%
	57.5%	84.4%	74%
	22.2%	51.8%	74%
Total	2664	4235	6899
	38.6%	61.4%	100%
	100%	100%	100%
	38.6%	61.4%	100%

Table 5 follows a similar pattern than table 3; it tells us that a lot of people did not do any of the two activities (26.9%) or just voted (34.4%). Among voters again we see two groups: voters that only voted (65%) and those that voted and protested (44%). The similar pattern is observed among protesters: a higher percentage has also voted than not (27% versus 11.7%). Table 6 shows that again most people did not do any of the two activities (rallying or protesting). Among protesters a little more did not rally (22.2%) than did (16.4%), but again the differences are not very large. Some of them seem to take protest as an extension of voting and rallying, but a substantial amount engages in protest only without rallying or voting. In fact 24% [7] of the whole sample engages in protest and does not engage in either voting or rallying.

What should we take from brief discussion? We can conclude that voting is the most common form of political participation in Arab countries and that there is a substantial proportion of voters (43.6%) that only voted, while the rest voted and engaged in some other form of participation (rallying and/or protesting). [8] Regarding those who rally, we can conclude that most of them have also voted and protested, so there are very few individuals that only engage in rallying. Rallying seems to be an extension from both voting and protesting. Finally, the population that protests is similar to that of voters in that it is divided into a group that only protests (and does not engage in any other form of participation) and a group that in addition to protest also votes and rallies.

Our dependent variables do not distinguish between these different subgroups within each form of participation, therefore in the analysis part of this paper we tried alternative operationalizations of our dependent variables to separate these subgroups. This was done as a robustness check because we wanted to test whether the group of individuals that only votes is different from the group that votes and protest or rallies. We did the same thing with ralliers and protesters separating those that engage only in that activity and those that engage in multiple forms of participation. In general our results are robust to these different operationalizations of the dependent variable, with the exception of protesters. There seems to be a different logic of participation between those individuals that only protest and those that protest and engage in other forms of participation. This merits further exploration in future versions of this paper. For now, however, we stick to our initial operationlization of the dependent variables.

5.2. Independent variables and controls

In order to test our different hypotheses we run three logit regressions, one for each of our dependent variables. The independent variables that are derived from our hypothesis are the following: *wasta*, trust in institutions, civic involvement, tolerance, political Islam, education) and two control variables (age and sex). Table 7 presents a summary of these variables.

Table 7: Independent and control variables

Label	Concept	Variable type and Range
Wasta	Have you used <i>wasta</i> in the past five years?	Dichotomous 0= No 1= Yes
Trust in Institutions	Trust in the main institutions of government: Prime Minister, The Courts and Parliament	Continuous Factor ranging from low trust in institutions (-1.47) to high trust in institutions (1.81)
Civic Involvement	a) Member of any organization or formal group? b) Follows news about politics and government	Index ranging from: 2= Neither a member of an organization nor follows the news 8= Both a member of an organization and follows the news
Tolerance	Factor that captures an individual's degree of tolerance and commitment to pluralism (see appendix for a detailed description of items forming this factor)	Continuous Factor ranging from low tolerance (-4.34) to high tolerance (1.31)
Political Islam	Factor that captures an individual's opinion on the importance that Islam and religion should have in political affairs (government, elections, candidates, law-making etc) (see appendix for a detailed description of items forming this factor)	Continuous Factor ranging from low support for Islam influencing political life (-1.94) to high support for Islam influencing political life (2.02)
Education	Level of education	Ordered categorical ranging from: 1= Illiterate 7= MA or higher
Age	Age	Ordered categorical ranging from: 1 to 7
Sex	Sex	Dichotomous 1=Male 2=Female

6. Analysis and Findings

The hypotheses we are testing fall into five categories: education and socioeconomic status, civic involvement and civic values, political trust, clientelism and *wasta*, and ideology and political Islam. The hypotheses themselves propose that one or more independent variables in each of these categories helps to account for variance on three dependent variables relating to electoral participation and protest behavior: voting, attendance at campaign rallies, and protest behavior like participating in a demonstration or signing a petition. We thus test three different models, one for each of our dependent variables. They are the following:

- $\text{Vote} = \text{wasta} + \text{trust in institutions} + \text{civic involvement} + \text{tolerance} + \text{political Islam} + \text{education} + \text{age} + \text{sex}$

- Rally= wasta + trust in institutions + civic involvement+ tolerance + political Islam + education +age + sex
- Protest= wasta + trust in institutions + civic involvement+ tolerance + political Islam + education +age +sex

Since the measures of the dependent variables are dichotomous, we test these hypotheses with binary logistic regression models, the results of which are shown in Tables 8a, 9a and 10a. Each table presents the results for one dependent variable for all six of the countries surveyed as part of the Arab Barometer. These tables present the beta coefficients from the logistic regression and below the p-values for the z-statistic to indicate the significance. These tables are presented to see the direction of the relationships and the significance level for each variable. However, since the beta coefficients are hard to interpret, below each table we present the odds ratio for each independent variable (Tables 8b, 9b and 10b). In addition, tables 11, 12 and 13 present the predicted probabilities for the three variables that are consistently statistically significant in our models. These can help interpret the magnitude of the effects of these variables.

[Tables 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 about here]

The first three categories of hypotheses are all drawn, at least in part, from research on political behavior in developed Western democracies. These posit education as one of the factors with a significant influence on electoral and protest behavior. But education is not significantly related to voting in any of the six countries included in this study; it is associated with participation in campaign rallies in only one of the six countries, Morocco, and in this case there is an inverse relationship, which is the opposite of what was proposed in H1; and it is positively associated with protest behavior in only two of the six countries, Jordan and Palestine, which is consistent with what was proposed in H2b. While the instances in which a significant relationship was observed merit consideration of the country-specific factors that might help explain these divergent patterns, the fact that only three of eighteen regressions involving education are statistically significant, and no more than one of three in any single country, strongly suggest that education is not an important determinant of electoral and protest behavior in the authoritarian political setting that exists in the Arab world.

H3 posits civic involvement as a determinant of participation, and H4 and H5a and H5b posit tolerance as a determinant of participation. Our analysis shows that civic involvement is an important factor. In every one of the eighteen regressions, based on six countries and three dependent variables, the relationship is positive and statistically significant. There is thus strong support for H3. The logic on which the H3 is based is summarized in the earlier discussion. As in Western democracies, political participation is associated with, and encouraged by, involvement in the public arena more generally, by experiences contributing to what is frequently described as social capital. More interesting still, is that civic participation is important for conventional and unconventional forms of participation. This indicates that all forms of political behavior require some form of civic commitment. By contrast, none of the regressions involving tolerance, which test the relationships proposed in H4, H5a and H5b, are statistically significant.

Research in the West shows that the kind of civic normative orientation of which tolerance and respect for pluralism are a part encourages political participation, but this does not appear to be the case in the Arab world.

H6, H7a and H7b posit trust in the country's political institutions as a determinant of political participation, and in this case the findings are mixed. The most clear cut and consistently significant finding concerns voting; in all six countries, individuals with a higher level of political trust are significantly more likely than others to vote. There is thus strong support for one of the relationships proposed by H6. Political trust is not consistently and significantly related to participation in campaign rallies, however. This relationship was only observed in Lebanon. A relationship between political trust and attendance participation in campaign rallies was also found in Jordan, but it is an inverse relationship, not that proposed by H6, and it is statistically significant only at the .10 level. With respect to protest behavior, there is some support for H7a and H7b but, again, findings are not consistent. There is a significant positive relationship, as proposed in H7a, only for Lebanon. There is a significant but inverse relationship, as proposed in H7b, only for Algeria and Morocco, and in the latter instance the relationship is only significant at the .10 level. Thus, while there may be some country-specific patterns to investigate for participation in rallies and protest behavior, the main finding is that political trust is an important factor that increases the likelihood of voting. This indicates that confidence in existing political institutions is important for voting behavior. Those with less political confidence are less likely to vote. In other words, voting becomes an act that may legitimize the existing authoritarian system by its existing supporters.

Although clientelism and ideology may not be unimportant in the West, a focus on *wasta* and political Islam place these considerations more fully within the political settings of the Arab world. H8 and H9a and H9b posit relationships involving clientelism, or the use of *wasta*; and H8, which pertains to voting and attendance at campaign rallies, is supported in the case of rallies but not in the case of voting. With respect to voting, there is only one instance, that of Lebanon, in which there is a positive and statistically significant relationship. With respect to campaign rallies, by contrast, there is a positive and significant relationship in five of the six countries, Palestine being the only case in which there no significant relationship. The use of *wasta* is also associated with protest behavior, as proposed in H9a and H9b. H9a proposes that the use of *wasta* increases the likelihood of protest behavior, and this is again the case in five of the six countries. Algeria is the one exception, and in Jordan the relationship is only significant at the .1 level. Taken together, these findings show the importance of *wasta* in the Arab context. The use of *wasta* is not related to voting, which is a less intense kind of political involvement. But it is related to attendance at rallies and protest behavior, deeper and more involved kinds of participation, in most instances, and for at least in one of these dependent variables in every country. *Wasta*, it appears, is just as important as civic participation for protest and rallies, but not voting. It appears, having access to governmental benefits facilitates political involvement, or conversely patrons may have expectations of constituents to partake in rallies and protests in

exchange for clientelist perks. Again, however, *wasta* appears to be an important factor shaping some forms of political behavior in the Arab world.

Finally, somewhat surprisingly, there are no statistically significant relationships involving support for political Islam, as posited in H10a and H10b. This suggests that ideology, or at least this aspect of ideology, is not an important determinant of voting, of attendance at rallies or of protest behavior in the Arab world. To a degree, this finding parallels that associated with tolerance, which also suggests that people who are more and less politically involved do not have very different normative orientations. Taken together with other findings, especially those associated with political trust and *wasta*, this suggests that connections to and judgments about the political system have much more explanatory power than do norms and values. Political trust makes it more likely that an individual will vote, and the political connections reflected in *wasta* are the most consistently important determinant of more involved kinds of political participation. Although beyond the scope of a fuller discussion at present, our analysis suggests two additional areas to be investigated in the future. One, mentioned in the discussion of methods, concerns the distinction between protest behavior as an alternative to “conventional” participation and protest behavior as an extension of this participation. The former refers to the behavior of citizens who engage in protest behavior but do not vote or attend rallies; in this case, presumably, it reflects an alienation from normal political involvement and represents genuine protest. The latter refers to the behavior of citizens who exhibit all of the forms of participation our data permit us to investigate, and this presumably indicates broad political involvement that does not imply alienation. While preliminary analysis of our data does not suggest that different findings will emerge when protest behavior is defined and measured in these ways, this possibility is deserving of further research.

The second area that deserves additional study is the possibility that findings about our hypotheses will not be the same for all categories of the population in some, or all, of the Arab Barometer countries. We have explored this in a preliminary fashion by disaggregating the data based on political trust, which in these models was then excluded as an independent variable. Other disaggregations, such as by sex or age, might also be instructive. In the case of political trust, findings about citizens with a high level of political trust and findings about those with a low level of political trust did not differ in most instances. There were some exceptions, however, the most important being that in four countries the use of *wasta* was significantly related to campaign rally attendance only among citizens with a low level of political trust. This suggests that *wasta* coupled with civic involvement are important for oppositional forms of participation as well. We plan to examine this and several other suggestive findings in the future, and also to see whether disaggregating the data on other variables yields useful insights.

7. Conclusion

Political participation in the Arab world is structured by a set of nuanced factors. Like citizens in western democracies, civic participation matters, and it matters for all forms of political participation. This finding is even robust among citizens with lower levels of political confidence.

That is pro-government and anti-government behaviors necessitate, or at least are very strongly encouraged by, civic involvement and participation. Those not engaged in the political process are those also not engaged in the civic sphere. Civic and political apathy are then a root cause of a dearth of political participation in the region. That those who are more educated are just as likely to be involved as those with less education adds an additional layer of insight into our investigation. Civic and political involvements are not structured by straightforward modernization predictors. Rather, as highlighted above, it appears that the route to greater participation is through connections and political trust.

Use of *wasta* and greater confidence in existing government institutions provide the pathway to participation. Trust in government institutions significantly increases the likelihood of voting and to a considerable extent is a necessary condition for casting a ballot. With respect to deeper levels of political engagement, such as attending campaign rallies or participating in protest demonstrations, both pro-regime patterns of behavior and those less so result from the connections and sense of comfort with the political establishment that *wasta* represents. This raises the following implication: all forms of political participation entail some acceptance of the authoritarian status quo. Working within the box, even through protest behavior, legitimizes the existing institutional parameters of these authoritarian states. Those who have access to these institutions and are more trusting of their policies are more likely to engage the overall system. This dynamic of political participation in the Arab world suggests two important insights that call into question the democratic usefulness of elections. First, elections are not only a means of co-opting elites and managing opposition groups, but further serve as a means to incorporate citizens into a political project designed to maintain the status quo. Second, and perhaps even more problematic, is that the entry costs to participation require increasing levels of trust and connections. If this is the criteria for active participation, citizens may opt, or find themselves required, to become part of a pacified sector that supports the status quo. The mechanisms that induce greater political participation in the Arab world, as reflected in our findings about the hypotheses we have tested, thus appear to reinforce and further legitimize the existing status quo, rather than to alter it.

Tables

Table 8a: Dependent variable: Vote (beta coefficients)

Vote	Algeria	Jordan	Morocco	Lebanon	Palestine	Yemen
Wasta	0.20 (0.350)	0.12 (0.549)	0.19 (0.185)	0.388 (0.056)	0.24 (0.244)	0.26 (0.245)
Trust in Institutions	0.50 (0.00)	0.22 (0.016)	0.37 (0.000)	0.22 (0.015)	0.23 (0.004)	0.43 (0.002)
Civic Involvement	0.35 (0.00)	0.14 (0.046)	0.16 (0.002)	0.27 (0.00)	0.25 (0.000)	0.40 (0.000)
Tolerance	-0.13 (0.166)	-0.08 (0.321)	0.08 (0.291)	0.10 (0.358)	--	0.04 (0.763)
Political Islam	0.07 (0.559)	-0.02 (0.847)	--	0.06 (0.576)	0.04 (0.671)	0.10 (0.564)
Education	0.00	-0.00	0.03	0.02	0.09	0.07

	(0.926)	(0.940)	(0.525)	(0.721)	(0.126)	(0.402)
Age	0.20	0.41	0.05	0.57	0.07	0.23
	(0.023)	(0.000)	(0.368)	(0.000)	(0.239)	(0.070)
Sex	-0.05	0.52	-0.00	-0.18	-0.22	-0.01
	(0.818)	(0.002)	(0.994)	(0.236)	(0.151)	(0.969)
N	505	686	848	920	991	428

Table shows odds ratios for each independent variables and below in parentheses the p-values for z-test indicating significance levels. In bold are significant values.

Table 8b: Dependent variable: Vote (odds ratios)

Vote	Algeria	Jordan	Morocco	Lebanon	Palestine	Yemen
Wasta	1.22	1.13	1.21	1.47	1.27	1.30
Trust in Institutions	1.65	1.25	1.45	1.24	1.26	1.54
Civic Involvement	1.42	1.15	1.17	1.31	1.29	1.50
Tolerance	0.88	0.92	1.08	1.10	--	1.04
Political Islam	1.07	0.98	--	1.06	1.04	1.10
Education	1.01	0.10	1.03	1.02	1.09	1.07
Age	1.23	1.51	1.05	1.77	1.07	1.26
Sex	0.95	1.68	0.10	0.83	0.80	0.99
N	505	686	848	920	991	428

Table shows odds ratios for each independent variable. The p-values for the z-test are not reported since they are the same as in Table 7a. In bold are significant odds ratios.

Table 9a: Dependent variable: Rally (beta coefficients)

Rally	Algeria	Jordan	Morocco	Lebanon	Palestine	Yemen
Wasta	0.82 (0.002)	0.71 (0.001)	0.49 (0.001)	1.08 (0.000)	0.28 (0.132)	0.72 (0.003)
Trust in Institutions	0.11 (0.425)	-0.16 (0.150)	0.04 (0.538)	0.27 (0.006)	-0.04 (0.648)	0.08 (0.560)
Civic Involvement	0.69 (0.00)	0.31 (0.000)	0.32 (0.000)	0.51 (0.000)	0.40 (0.000)	0.49 (0.000)
Tolerance	-0.16 (0.214)	0.05 (0.586)	-0.10 (0.172)	0.01 (0.959)	--	0.09 (0.480)
Political Islam	0.11 (0.460)	-0.16 (0.249)	--	0.14 (0.288)	-0.11 (0.182)	0.08 (0.643)
Education	0.11 (0.234)	-0.02 (0.787)	-0.17 (0.001)	0.015 (0.808)	0.08 (0.156)	-0.01 (0.937)
Age	0.08 (0.514)	0.16 (0.025)	-0.08 (0.134)	-0.08 (0.232)	-0.17 (0.002)	0.10 (0.491)
Sex	-0.13 (0.627)	-0.55 (0.008)	-0.80 (0.000)	-0.19 (0.300)	-0.52 (0.001)	-0.57 (0.023)
N	519	687	967	913	1005	429

Table shows odds ratios for each independent variables and below in parentheses the p-values for the z-test indicating significance levels. In bold are significant values.

Table 9b: Dependent variable: Rally (odds ratios)

Rally	Algeria	Jordan	Morocco	Lebanon	Palestine	Yemen
Wasta	2.27	2.04	1.64	2.94	1.32	2.06
Trust in Institutions	1.12	0.86	1.05	1.32	0.96	1.08
Civic Involvement	1.98	1.37	1.39	1.67	1.50	1.63
Tolerance	0.85	1.05	0.90	1.01	--	1.10
Political Islam	1.11	0.85	--	1.14	0.89	1.09
Education	1.12	0.98	0.85	1.01	1.08	0.99
Age	1.08	1.18	0.92	0.92	0.85	1.10
Sex	0.88	0.58	0.45	0.83	0.60	0.56
N	519	687	967	913	1005	429

Table shows odds ratios for each independent variable. The p-values for the z-test are not reported since they are the same as in Table 8a. In bold are significant odds ratios.

Table 10a: Dependent variable: Protest (beta coefficients)

Rally	Algeria	Jordan	Morocco	Lebanon	Palestine	Yemen
Wasta	0.32 (0.118)	0.39 (0.081)	0.81 (0.000)	0.85 (0.000)	0.72 (0.000)	0.68 (0.004)
Trust in Institutions	-0.25 (0.019)	-0.06 (0.578)	-0.13 (0.088)	0.25 (0.002)	0.13 (0.103)	0.19 (0.160)
Civic Involvement	0.45 (0.000)	0.30 (0.000)	0.43 (0.000)	0.38 (0.000)	0.43 (0.000)	0.51 (0.000)
Tolerance	-0.04 (0.676)	0.04 (0.680)	-0.07 (0.380)	0.10 (0.304)	--	-0.02 (0.878)
Political Islam	-0.05 (0.682)	-0.13 (0.354)	--	-0.04 (0.723)	0.09 (0.271)	-0.01 (0.956)
Education	0.01 (0.905)	0.24 (0.001)	0.02 (0.724)	0.01 (0.820)	0.12 (0.023)	0.06 (0.432)
Age	-0.08 (0.385)	-0.14 (0.082)	0.05 (0.326)	-0.31 (0.000)	-0.13 (0.014)	-0.06 (0.633)
Sex	-0.32 (0.117)	-0.58 (0.006)	-0.84 (0.000)	0.08 (0.588)	-0.88 (0.000)	-0.51 (0.030)
N	532	691	967	934	1006	419

Table shows odds ratios for each independent variables and below in parentheses the p-values for the z-test indicating significance levels. In bold are significant values.

Table 10b: Dependent variable: Protest (odds ratios)

Rally	Algeria	Jordan	Morocco	Lebanon	Palestine	Yemen
Wasta	1.38	1.48	2.26	2.33	2.06	1.97
Trust in Institutions	0.78	0.94	0.88	1.29	1.14	1.21
Civic Involvement	1.56	1.35	1.53	1.46	1.54	1.66
Tolerance	0.96	1.04	0.93	1.11	--	0.98
Political Islam	0.96	0.88	--	0.96	1.10	0.99
Education	1.01	1.28	1.02	1.01	1.13	1.07
Age	0.92	0.87	1.06	0.732	0.88	0.94
Sex	0.73	0.56	0.43	1.08	0.41	0.60
N	532	691	967	934	1006	419

Table shows odds ratios for each independent variable. The p-values for the z-test are not reported since they are the same as in Table 9a. In bold are significant odds ratios.

Table 11: Predicted probabilities for *civic involvement* variable

Dependent variable	Vote	Rally	Protest
2 Low civic involvement	0.43	0.09	0.21
3	0.49	0.13	0.29
4	0.55	0.19	0.38
5	0.60	0.28	0.48
6	0.66	0.38	0.59
7	0.71	0.49	0.69
8 High civic involvement	0.76	0.60	0.77

Table 12: Predicted probabilities for *wasta* variable

Dependent variable	Vote	Rally	Protest
0 No, did not use wasta	0.57	0.17	0.36
1 Yes, did use wasta	0.54	0.34	0.51

Table 13: Predicted probabilities for *trust in institutions* variable

Dependent variable	Vote	Rally	Protest
Low trust in institutions (-1.47)	0.48	0.18	0.42
High trust in institutions (1.81)	0.66	0.27	0.39

Appendix:

Variable	Original questions from the survey
Vote	Q207 Did you participate in the elections on 6/17/2003? Yes No
Rally	Q210 During the last national election [in date X], did you attend a campaign meeting or rally? Yes No
Protest	Q230 Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these please tell me whether you, personally, have ever done each of these things in the past three years. 1. Join together with others to draw attention to an issue or sign a petition 1. Once 2. More than Once 3. Never 2. Attend a demonstration or protest march 1. Once 2. More than Once 3. Never
Education	Q703 Level of education 1=Illiterate

- 2=Elementary
- 3= Primary
- 4= Secondary
- 5= College diploma
- 6= BA
- 7= MA or higher

Wasta	<p>Q226 During the past five years, have you ever used wasta to achieve something personal, family related, or a neighborhood problem?</p> <p>1=Yes 2=No</p>
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Civic Involvement	<p>Q202 Are you a member of any organization or formal groups? “Political parties, living cooperatives or local societies, religious organizations, sport and entertainment clubs, cultural organizations, associations or workers’ unions, farmer unions, professional unions or associations economic organizations or associations, entrepreneurial organizations, parent-teacher associations, or other voluntary organizations.”</p> <p>1=Yes 2=No</p>
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	<p>Q216 How often do you follow news about politics and government in Jordan?</p> <p>1=Very often 2=Often 3=Sometimes/rarely 4=Never</p>
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Trust in institutions	<p>Q210.1-Q201.2-Q201.3 I’m going to name a number of institutions. For each one, please tell me how much trust you have in them. Is it a great deal of trust, quite a lot of trust, not very much trust, or none at all?</p> <p>1. Prime minister 2. The courts 3. Parliament</p>
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Political Islam	<p>Q246.4 I’m going to describe various types of political systems that exist in the Middle East and ask what you think about each as a way of governing [country]. “A system governed by Islamic law in which there are no political parties or elections”</p> <p>1=Very suitable 2=Suitable 3=Somewhat suitable 4=Not suitable at all</p>
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	<p>Q256.4 What factors would you consider when voting for candidates in an election for political office? “Religiosity”</p> <p>1=Very important 2=Important 3=Not very important 4=Not important at all</p>
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	<p>Q401.2-Q401.3 How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?</p> <p>2. “It would be better for Jordan is more people with strong religious beliefs held public office”</p> <p>1=Strongly Agree 2= Agree 3=Disagree 4=Strongly disagree</p>
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	<p>3. “Men of religion should have no influence over the decisions of government”</p>
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- 1=Strongly Agree
- 2= Agree
- 3=Disagree
- 4=Strongly disagree

Q402.2 In your opinion, how important is each of the following principles as a guide for making the laws of our country?

2. “The government should implement only the laws of the sharia”

- 1=Strongly Agree
- 2= Agree
- 3=Disagree
- 4=Strongly disagree

Tolerance

Q255.2 People sometimes talk about the factors that make a person qualified for national leadership. On this card are listed some of the qualifications to which different people would give priority. Please state which one of these you, yourself, consider the most important.

2.” Openness to diverse political ideas”

- 1=Very important
- 2=Important
- 3=Not very important
- 4=Not important at all

Q303.2 Which of the following groups you do wish to have as neighbors?

2. “People of different race or color”

- 1= I don’t wish
- 2= I don’t mind

Q504.2 Today as in the past, Muslim scholars and jurists sometimes disagree about the proper interpretation of Islam in response to present-day issues. For each of the statements listed below, please indicate whether you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly with the interpretation of Islam that is presented.

2. “Islam requires that in a Muslim country the political rights of non-Muslims should be inferior to those of Muslims”

- 1=Strongly Agree
- 2= Agree
- 3=Disagree
- 4=Strongly disagree

Age

Q701 Age

- 1=18-24
- 2=25-34
- 3=35-44
- 4=45-54
- 5=55-64
- 6=65-74
- 7=75-100

Sex

Q702 Gender

- 1= Male
- 2= Female

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^[1] Note the exceptions in the literature that do address non-democracies. Most of them are interested in recently democratized nations such as Eastern Europe and Southern Europe.

^[2] Exceptions include Ellen Lust-Okar and Lisa Blayde's work.

^[3] Ellen Lust-Okar: Elections under Authoritarianism: Preliminary Lessons from Jordan. *Democratization*. Vol. 13, no. 3, pg. 459.

^[4] The dataset also includes Kuwait, but we have not included this country in the analysis because at the time the survey was conducted in this country, only males were allowed to vote. Given that electoral participation is one of our main dependent variables, we thought this would skew our cross-country comparisons on electoral behavior.

^[5] For a more detailed explanation of the response options, see the appendix.

^[6] Jackman and Miller (1995). There is much more variation in turnout rates among Latin American countries (see Fornos et al. 2004).

^[7] This figure is based on three-way cross-tabulation table between vote, rally and protest, which has not been included in the paper.

^[8] When running the analysis we consider alternative operationalizations of the dependent variables to isolate the groups that are mutually exclusive in each of the forms of participation. We do not obtain substantially different results from our initial operationalization.

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